inclusive democracy . . . as the army has withdrawn from overt political rule," the editors add that "The legacy of the war is still present in the chilling influence of the so-called ‘hidden powers’; clandestine networks of active and retired military officers now reconstituted as organized-crime rings" (442–43). Tracing the history of pan-Maya movements from the nineteenth century to the present, but especially since 1996, the editors lament that “more than ten years after the end of the war, much of the political agenda of the postwar Pan-Maya Movement has stalled” (503).

A final chapter offers conclusions and a view of the present and future possibilities for Guatemala. With an appeal to travelers, students, and scholars, The Guatemala Reader is a useful volume. As an introduction to the country and its people, it drives home some of the stark realities behind its beautiful facade.

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Tanya Harmer has written a fine international history of Chile’s foreign relations from 1970 to 1973 when the country, as she writes, became “a theater of the inter-American Cold War on whose stage a whole cast of actors from the Southern Cone, the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union (though far less so), and Europe (both East and West) assumed positions against each other and as sponsors of their divided Chilean allies” (186). The book examines how foreign actors perceived and responded to Salvador Allende’s election along with Chilean responses to a complex and rapidly evolving external landscape. Harmer’s objective is to situate the Popular Unity (UP) in a “unique multisided contest between regional proponents of communism and capitalism, albeit in various forms” (1). Crucially, she argues that the main adversaries in this conflict were Havana and Washington, not Moscow and Washington.

The Cuban Government, for instance, provided bodyguards to ensure Allende’s personal safety and supplied weapons, advice, military training, and logistical support to Chile’s left wing parties. More generally Harmer underlines Havana’s tremendous importance for the Latin American Left. Chileans drew inspiration from Cuba’s example: anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and fully defiant of the Western Hemisphere’s hegemonic power. Additionally, the model included a belief in the necessity of dictatorship and revolutionary violence. Although Allende maintained a commitment to democratic constitutionalism he nonetheless supported Cuba’s revolution and maintained close personal ties with Fidel Castro, a fact that terrified right wing Chileans and helped to convince assorted
inter-American actors including Brazil’s military regime of the absolute
need for counterrevolution in Chile.

In 1970 leaders in both Santiago and Havana believed the UP electoral
triumph heralded a substantive change in inter-American relations. Allende believed rising third world nationalism and détente between the
superpowers could provide sufficient the political space he needed to
achieve revolutionary goals. Yet Chile’s policymakers seriously underestimated the depth of regional hostility towards their socialist experiment. One of Harmer’s most striking findings is the zeal with which Brasilia pro-
moted and exported counterrevolution to Bolivia and Chile from 1970 to
1973, often independently of Washington. And the United States proved
etirely unwilling to apply détente to the global south or negotiate a modus
vivendi with Allende’s government. In short, Santiago tried to challenge
Washington and redefine Chile’s place in the world system but it lacked a
viable alternative to US loans, credit, and machinery; the USSR refused to
subsidize Chile’s revolutionary process and the socialist bloc could not
replace Chile’s trade relations with the United States.

The academic literature on the UP’s brief socialist experiment is con-
siderable. In it many scholars have squarely blamed the Nixon Adminis-
tration’s policies towards Chile for Allende’s eventual downfall. Harmer’s
work, which belongs to the New Cold War History, rejects any notion that
Chile’s affairs could have been decisively controlled or manipulated by
outside actors. She writes, “The international history of Allende’s over-
throw is a far more complex story than a simple case of “who did it?” To
appreciate its significance, we need to ask why foreigners got involved in
the battle for Chile between 1970 and 1973 and with what consequences for
that country, the hemisphere, and beyond” (252). Refreshingly, the book
does not rehash the well-known details of failed CIA efforts to prevent
Allende from reaching power in 1970.

The scope of Harmer’s research is impressive. She weaves together a
diverse set of sources from archives in Chile, Brazil, the United States, as
well as several countries in the former Soviet bloc. She compensates for her
restricted access to source material in the Russian Federation and especially
Cuba by drawing on testimonial literature and personal interviews with
historical figures in Cuba and Chile. The result is an impressively rich,
analytical narrative notwithstanding a fragmentary source base.

Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War is a highly readable ac-
count of Chilean foreign policy objectives from 1970 to 1973 that makes a
significant contribution to the historiography. It draws on an impressive
array of sources from Latin America, the United States, and Europe and
brings a new coherence to the external constraints Allende faced in the
lead up to his overthrow in 1973. Harmer argues that the establishment of
a right wing military government in Chile marked a turning point in the
Western Hemisphere as counterrevolution decisively triumphed across
South America and Cuba turned its attention towards achieving victories
for revolutionary socialism in Africa. This book is essential reading for
students of the Cold War, US-Latin American relations, and revolutionary movements in the global south. The book also provides a major insight into the foreign policy goals of the UP, revolutionary Cuba, and Brazil’s military regime at the start of the seventies.

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Of all the shortcomings in the historiography of modern Argentina, none is more frequently bemoaned than the failure to pay adequate attention to the nation’s interior. And indeed, entire library shelves are filled with books that claim to address Argentine history but in fact only examine events in Buenos Aires. Although provincial histories exist, far less common are works that use a regional perspective to shed new light on national narratives. Mark A. Healey’s impressive study of the rebuilding of the Andean city of San Juan after the earthquake of 1944 does just that, offering an innovative account of the advent and consolidation of Peronism, Argentina’s most important political movement. Along the way, Healey uncovers the key roles played by bureaucrats, politicians, engineers and architects, provides an illuminating history of architectural modernism and city planning, and convincingly demonstrates the centrality of the San Juan earthquake in Argentine history.

The earthquake of January 15, 1944 destroyed most of the adobe buildings that comprised the colonial city of San Juan and killed some 10,000 people. The disaster is well known to historians as the *raison d’être* of the Buenos Aires benefit concert at which Juan Perón met his future wife, Eva Duarte. Yet beyond this event, the earthquake is invisible in most accounts of the rise of Peronism, which typically limit their focus to Buenos Aires or, at best, the nation’s industrial core in the cities of the littoral. Healey argues convincingly that Perón’s vision of a “New Argentina” was first elaborated in response to the challenge of rebuilding San Juan. But Perón’s most ambitious plans for the city and province never came to fruition. Healey carefully charts the struggles between the winery owners who constituted the local elite, anti-Peronist engineers, modernist architects committed to a radical reinvention of the city, and local political bosses anxious to come to terms with the new political climate. The result is a fascinating political history that is particularly sensitive to the importance of tactical maneuvers and alliances. Elites seeking to preserve their property and power opposed proposals to relocate the city, arguing instead that the way to prevent future disasters was to replace adobe with concrete. For