In the twentieth century Chile’s armed forces belonged to a global community of military professionals that shared ideas and closely observed each other. In the first half of the century Chilean officers imbibed the theoretical innovations that proceeded from Europe’s great industrial wars. After 1945 they came into contact with the doctrines and methods of the United States armed forces as a result of their connection to an inter-American defense framework dominated by Washington. Scholars have devoted rightful attention to the US role training Latin American militaries during the Cold War and the implications of that training for the behavior and ideological commitments of subsequent military regimes. However, there is a relative deficit of scholarship that takes seriously the capacity of South American militaries to generate their own ideas about national security as semi-autonomous institutions. Historians have identified foundational experiences, ideas, myths, and traditions that developed among South American armies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with an eye to the long-term consequences of those ideas for institutional behavior. Nonetheless, scholarship tends to discount the intellectual traditions and distinctive security concerns of Latin American soldiers after 1945.

In the seventies and eighties structural, sociological approaches to Latin America’s militaries predominated. Guillermo O’Donnell’s famous formulation held that South American soldiers represented the interests of global capitalism backed up by the Pentagon; their role in the world system was to discipline labor movements, destroy left wing politics, and empower technocrats who would make possible the flow of transnational capital to Latin America. This instrumentalist interpretation could not explain everything about the behavior of individual military governments or their relationship to international capitalism, but the idea that the Pentagon created a hemispheric army of foot soldiers committed to US strategic interests and trained to repress left wing movements has endured. Without denying the Pentagon’s hemispheric influence, it is important to underline that US military influence did not overwhelm the national traditions or local concerns of professional soldiers who possessed anticommunist sentiments, advanced training facilities, and native intellectual traditions well before the era of North American hegemony.
In the second half of the twentieth century Chilean officers drew conclusions about the Cold War, international relations, and modern warfare by studying armed conflicts in the international arena. The Six Days War (1967) led Chilean officers to consider preemptive action as an effective means to achieve a rapid military decision. The Indo-Pakistan conflicts (1965, 1971) reinforced a conviction that underdeveloped states should not expect decisive intervention from the United Nations or any ‘great power’ at the outbreak of inter-state hostilities. In Vietnam and Algeria the ability of tenacious guerilla fighters to frustrate powerful conventional armies pointed to the value of human will, leadership, and ideological conviction as factors that could transcend material superiority. Meanwhile the establishment of military governments in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), and Peru (1968) presented a new model for dealing with communist insurgency and inadequate economic modernization. Peru and Argentina’s military regimes also heightened the external security concerns of Chilean soldiers. In sum, this international landscape raised a number of questions for consideration. How is warfare different when waged by semi-industrialized states with limited conventional forces? Do professional soldiers in the developing world have a fundamentally different societal role than their counterparts in the developed world? What lessons can be taken from the experience of militaries engaged in counterinsurgency operations?

This article, based on institutional publications and testimonial literature, has two principle objectives. First, it highlights the Chilean military’s academic tradition and the importance of that tradition for doctrine and behavior. The country’s school of geopolitics, for instance, grounded the national security doctrine adopted during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990). Second, it situates the Chilean military in relation to world events and demonstrates the significance of wars in Vietnam, South Asia, and the Middle East among other events for the ideological, strategic, and tactical dispositions of Chilean officers. I will show that these international convulsions manifestly influenced the behavior of Chilean soldiers as they overthrew Salvador Allende, implemented a national security doctrine, and responded to the possibility of armed conflict with Peru. Drawing attention to the voice of Chilean military actors as they internalized lessons from armed conflicts elsewhere in the world sheds a new light on the Pinochet regime and departs from a marked tendency to overlook the indigenous perspective of South American militaries after 1945.

A Tradition of Study

Chile’s triumph over Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) had manifold consequences. Santiago took control of the Atacama Desert and its bounty of natural resources. Peru endured a lengthy military occupation. Bolivia lost all access to the Pacific Ocean. Less well known is the fact that Chile relinquished its claim to Atlantic Patagonia as a measure to keep Argentina from entering the conflict. Besides a legacy
of unresolved border disputes, mutual suspicion, and historical rivalries, the long conflict exposed the Chilean armed forces’ lack of preparedness to fight a modern war. To a significant extent, Chile owed its victory to the dysfunction of its rivals’ governments rather than to a smoothly operating military machine of its own. It was the need for improved organization combined with the fear of a revanchist Peru that led the Chilean government to hire army officers from the German Empire in 1885 to assist with a process of modernization. The consequences of these training missions have been a subject of debate among historians. Frederick Nunn traces the ethos underpinning South American military interventions in civilian politics during the twentieth century to the European training missions from 1890 to 1940. William Sater and Holger Herwig, by contrast, view Chile’s ‘prussianization’ as largely cosmetic.

In Chile historians tend to stress the lasting, indelible imprint German trainers made on the Chilean army, not just its music, marches, or uniforms, but in more substantive ways such a respect for hierarchy, discipline, and devotion to theoretical study. Indeed, one major legacy of ‘prussianization’ was the founding of the Army Academy of War in 1886—Latin America’s first such institution of higher learning—which standardized academic curriculum and groomed the best and brightest officers for positions of institutional leadership. An important value introduced by German trainers was the view of warfare as an evolving science that required constant study and professional preparation. Officers assigned to the academy read theory, analyzed foreign events, and played war games simulating large-scale engagements on topographical maps. In 1904, the army and navy sent officials to observe the unfolding Russo-Japanese War. The new military culture produced leaders who tended to be multilingual, well traveled, and knowledgeable of foreign affairs. Henceforth, academic achievement led to career advancement and won officers the respect of their peers. Army Generals René Schneider, Carlos Parts, and Augusto Pinochet all won acclaim as instructors at the academy before reaching the pinnacle of their institution. Pinochet, a professor of geopolitics and military geography, wrote two books during his time at the academy: Síntesis Geográfica de Chile, Argentina, Bolivia y Perú and Geopolítica: diferentes etapas para el estudio geopolítico de los estados. The former remains a standard instructional text.

The army’s preeminent thinker in the second half of the twentieth century, General Bernardino Parada, is a noteworthy example of the institution’s academic tradition. Admired for his intellectual sophistication Parada directed the academy of war (1961–1963) before serving as army commander in chief (1964–1967). After retirement he published a treatise representing his personal attempt, after years of study and reflection, to deduce immutable, universal laws and subsidiary principles governing war and geopolitics. Among his ‘supreme laws of war’ in the Polemología Básica are the ‘law of action’ and ‘law of concentration’. The former asserts that only offensive action can secure a decisive victory while the latter
underlines the imperative of attacking one’s adversary with concentrated force at the vital centre of resistance rather than in equilibrium along the enemy line. Parada writes, ‘one of the greatest errors a military strategist can commit is to employ force “by drops” when confronting the enemy.’

Esteemed for its brevity, originality, and fluid use of historical examples, the *Polemología* remains a standard text at Chile’s war academies. In 1971 General René Álvarez Marín utilized Parada’s supreme laws of war to conduct his own lengthy analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, illustrating the degree to which the Chilean army had developed its own self-referential academic tradition. General Parada’s book and career reflect two key aspects of Chilean army culture: high regard for erudite soldiers and a penchant, among an influential group of institutional leaders, to articulate general theories of war and geopolitics.

Another emblem of the changes that accompanied late nineteenth-century modernization was the publication of service journals for officers to write about and reflect on issues related to their profession. In future, the *Revista de la Marina, Memorial del Ejército de Chile*, and later the *Revista de la Fuerza Aérea* would define the boundaries of acceptable military thought, promote values, beliefs, and discernible political orientations. These journals also embedded officers in a much wider transnational community because South American militaries exchanged professional publications and Chilean officers transcribed or translated material they considered useful from western militaries. These journals offer valuable insights into military thought although they remain underutilized sources in English language scholarship.

**Chilean Geopolitics: implications for national security doctrine**

One intellectual tradition shared by each branch of the Chilean armed forces is geopolitical analysis. Chilean geopolitics is significant for inculcating a set of ideas about the state and making certain claims to objective knowledge. Its most notable specialist, Augusto Pinochet, described geopolitics as the analysis and management of the state based on the premise that states experience periodic stages of growth and decline relative to those around them. In Pinochet’s words ‘Geopolitics views the state as a living organism engaged in a constant struggle for survival.’ The intellectual lineage of this concept (state as an organic entity in competition with others around it) dates back to the army’s institutional connection to Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1945, however, Chilean soldiers had established their own self-sustaining tradition of geopolitical analysis.

Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), the last of the great German geopoliticians, formulated objectives that eventually became Nazi doctrine: *lebensraum* (vital living space for a growing state) and tariff protectionism to foster economic autarky. For Haushofer, territorial expansion signaled a healthy, expanding state. After World War Two, Chilean thinkers explicitly rejected any notion that extending national borders was a sign of
health. Colonel Humberto Medina explained that geopolitical analysis was a neutral academic discipline, neither inherently good nor bad, but rather a tool to understand the interaction of human beings inside the state. As ‘possibilists’, Chilean thinkers rejected the Nazi emphasis on racial and geographic determinism. They believed a nation could overcome environmental challenges, but they retained the decidedly German concept of an organic state subject to stages of growth, decline, even death.19

One purpose of geopolitics, according to its specialists, was the identification of universal laws governing the growth and decline of states and to assist national leaders formulate judicious policies to rectify state weaknesses. For example, Pinochet pointed to the lack of human settlement in Chile’s northern and southern territories. He warned that Chile’s remote regions would be vulnerable to absorption by surrounding states without adequate transportation infrastructure linking far flung regions to the populated central valley or government initiatives to promote self-sustaining regional economic activity. Other threats to the Chilean State might include a weak economy, bureaucratic inefficiency, the immigration of non-national peoples to remote regions, or internally divisive politics. Like most of his colleagues Pinochet regarded the Marxist concept of class struggle among irreconciliable socio-economic groups as an artificial, inorganic division of the social whole.20

Geopoliticians held that only the state itself could reverse a process of decline and therefore the state had a primordial right to allocate human and material resources to achieve long term goals. In the words of one army major, ‘for the state there are only objectives and everything that serves to achieve its objectives, is appropriate and legitimate, granting total validity to the expression that the ends justify the means.’21 Such geopolitical precepts, fused with anti-communist ideology provided intellectual scaffolding for a national security doctrine that granted the state the right to neutralize internal threats and engage in social and economic engineering to secure its survival. Furthermore, geopoliticians like Pinochet claimed to possess an objective, scientific understanding of the state’s ‘permanent interests’, which conferred legitimacy on his major policy decisions during the dictatorship.22

When asked about US influence on Chile’s national security doctrine General Julio Canessa—a member of the junta from 1985 to 1986—confirmed that the Pentagon had emphasized internal security at a continental level following the Cuban Revolution but he insisted:

National security is an integral activity of the State. As such it is permanent and has no family name [meaning no doctrinal origin in one country or another]. As military personnel we are taught from day one that, like any living organism, the survival of the nation is never definitively assured at any point in time. Threats, dangers and obstructions hinder its normal development. Sovereign nations appear and disappear with alarming regularity.23
While the concept of an organic state grounded institutional ideas about national security, another crucial idea held that as guardians of the fatherland, soldiers had the obligation to intervene in the political system if they perceived existential threats to the state. Both concepts antedated 1945 and both would animate the ideology and policy initiatives of the dictatorship. After September 11, 1973 Chile’s junta spoke of eradicating the Marxist ‘cancer’ from the fatherland and rejuvenating the nation’s ‘gangrenous political system’. Augusto Pinochet pledged to sanitize unhealthy political habits from the body politic and in 1975 he described the national economy as undergoing major ‘surgery’. Far from being a mere coincidence, the use of medical imagery flowed from these institutional leaders’ view of the state as an organic, superhuman entity.

In 1974 the military regime initiated an administrative reform that was intended to create autonomous poles of development across the length of the country and reverse the ongoing concentration of political and economic power in Santiago.** With respect to social spending the regime clearly privileged, in the aggregate, poor under-populated zones in the north and south.** Pinochet’s construction of an expensive highway system in remote southern territories, the *Carrera Austral*, aimed to accomplish twin geopolitical objectives: connect citizens from isolated parts of the country to the mainland and attract citizens to less settled regions.** The junta, if not the entire armed forces, regarded the liberalization of Chile’s economy as oxygenating the blood of the economy. When the military regime left power in 1990 it possessed an enduring conviction of having successfully carried out a comprehensive overhaul of decaying, moribund state structures. Pinochet and others spoke of having established a vital cycle of expansion in the life of the Chilean State, of modernizing its economy and bureaucratic structures, of breathing into it the *fuerzas vivas* (vital forces) needed to begin a sustained growth cycle.**

**Analyzing Conflicts Abroad**

An army colonel and member of Chile’s Academy of Military History, Walter Dörner, writes ‘The best way to acquire knowledge about warfare is through direct experience which in the Chilean case has not occurred since the Civil War of 1891; this has made it necessary to study and analyze armed conflicts with transcendent consequences that have occurred in the international arena.’** Indeed, events abroad afforded Chilean soldiers opportunities to reflect on the nature of modern warfare, international relations, and the unique challenges of defending a country with an underdeveloped economy, complex internal politics, and a national territory with rugged expanses of desert, mountain, and sea. In the fifties the Army Academy of War prioritized studying theatres of operations from the Second World War most similar to Chilean landscapes. Thus, army officers scrutinized tank battles in North Africa and alpine warfare in Italy where the theatres of operation most resembled the Atacama Desert and Andean mountain passes.**
In the nineteen fifties Chilean officers imagined themselves fighting a conventional, inter-state war. Such a conflict, they assumed, would be a drawn out test of national endurance requiring the state to achieve maximum output from all available human and material resources. The century’s two world wars, so defined by their essential condition as ‘total wars’, shaped basic ideas about modern warfare. In 1955 the Army General Staff published Colonel Manuel Montt’s manual on the strategic and political management of war. Reflecting contemporary concerns, it focused almost exclusively on the state’s role directing production, sustaining morale, and eliminating any internal obstacles to an efficient wartime mobilization. Officers did not fail to observe that Chile’s chances of winning a total war were slim if industrial capacity alone proved the deciding factor. Compared to Peru and Argentina, Chile had a smaller population and economy. In light of this reality, Chilean officers agreed that they would have to rely on superior political and military leadership to prevail over rival states; national leaders would have to mobilize the country and its war machine faster and more effectively.

From 1965 to 1973, the Arab-Israel and Indo-Pakistani wars provided important food for thought at Chile’s war academies. For one, the wars were brief. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war lasted fourteen days while Israel’s blitzkrieg in 1967 lasted just six, facts that pointed to the value of initiative. Another unexpected pattern was aerial combat, which took place at low altitudes and subsonic speeds that privileged maneuverability and acceleration. In short, these wars defied expectations and provided opportunities to analyze the strategy and tactics of the belligerents, the performance of different weapon systems, and the behavior of international actors like the UN Security Council.

Israel’s stunning victory over a coalition of Arab states in the Six Days War (1967) fired the imagination of Chile’s soldiers. Intangible factors—will, leadership, decisive action—appeared to have saved the small nation from material determinism. David had slain Goliath, so to speak. For a military preoccupied with the possibility of encirclement by Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, Israel’s defensive and offensive doctrines had already become perennial subjects of interest at army, navy, and air force war academies. The army’s institutional history comments that ‘Chilean officials who have acted as observers [in the Middle East] have contributed valuable insights into the unfolding conflict and Israel’s modus operandi in defense of its difficult territory.’

Chilean officers who wrote about the Six Days War emphasized several major points. First, Israel’s pre-emptive air strikes and rapid tank assault had negated Egypt’s ability to draw on its superior numbers and material resources to wage a war of attrition. Because underdeveloped nations lack the industrial infrastructure to manufacture sophisticated weapons systems, they must rely on a finite supply of externally purchased arms, not easily replaced in wartime. Israel avoided supply problems by attacking the Arab coalition before it could coordinate an effective mobilization.
Second, accurate military intelligence and intrepid offensive action, wrote Chilean officers, allowed Israel to set the tempo of the conflict and stun its neighbors. Third, Chilean officers observed that the Soviet Union and the United States, not wanting to be drawn into direct confrontation, strongly urged their allies to refrain from starting a war. Egyptian president Gamal Nasser’s decision to wait and see how the great powers might intervene delayed the speed of his response to Israel’s offensive. Crucially, neither the USSR nor the US offered much direct assistance to the Arab coalition or Israel. These events strengthened a conviction that small states would be unwise to expect swift intervention from the United Nations or any superpower at the outset of a regional conflict. One army general wrote ‘The [Six Day War] provides a persuasive lesson about the uselessness of the United Nations and its Security Council. Unlike her enemies, Israel relied on military strength for her protection rather than superpowers or international organizations’.\(^{34}\)

Another small group of Chilean officers actually witnessed the Arab-Israel conflict first hand as commissioned UN military observers. Navy Captain Salvador García and Army Colonel Julio von Chrismar, for instance, lived in the Sinai Peninsula near the line of fire during hostilities between Egypt and Israel in 1969 and 1970. The experience allowed both men to study Israeli defensive positions along the eastern shore of the Suez Canal in the midst of artillery barrages, aerial attacks, and anti-aircraft fire.\(^{35}\) In a very direct way the Middle Eastern conflict constituted a template on which officers could contemplate Chile’s border with Peru.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War offered another test case for what could unfold in the Southern Cone. The principal jets of the Indian Air Force were Hawker Hunters, which Chile had recently ordered from Great Britain, while the mainstay of the Pakistani Air Force was the American built F-86 Sabre, owned in large numbers by Peru and Argentina. During the war’s air battles, Pakistani pilots shot down a number of the faster Hawker Hunters while managing to protect their fleet from bombardment, prompting Chilean air force officers to conclude that Pakistani pilots prevailed because of ‘superior training, morale, and combat tactics’. Furthermore, Pakistan had acquired the intelligence necessary to deliver important blows to India’s much larger military.\(^{36}\) Despite tactical errors on both sides the war seemed to confirm what the Chilean military wanted to hear: a smaller country with good leadership and prudent pre-war preparations could hold its own against a much larger country.\(^{37}\)

Wars in the Middle East and South Asia highlighted the material vulnerabilities of semi-industrial states and reinforced a conviction that it was unwise to expect decisive assistance from international actors or external powers. Officers observed that France, Britain, and the United States had immediately suspended the sale of spare parts and new weapons to the belligerents at the outbreak of hostilities in 1965, forcing both India and Pakistan to initiate desperate searches on international arms markets.\(^{38}\)
wars also provided opportunities to analyze a basic dilemma surrounding the cost and quality of weaponry. After serving a stint as a UN military observer in South Asia during 1965 artillery specialist Colonel Pedro Ewing concluded that it was preferable to acquire a reduced number of high-quality, heavy caliber guns rather than a greater number of low caliber pieces requiring less expensive munitions. For a resource-constrained armed forces such as Chile’s ‘cost-quality’ questions inevitably inform the procurement of armaments.

The nature of the conflicts also spoke to existing debates. For example, the North American doctrine of strategic bombardment held that a country’s air force should have the capacity to completely annihilate the manufacturing capabilities, transportation network, and communication infrastructure of an enemy state. In the forties and fifties air force officers returning from study in the United States argued that Chile needed to acquire a fleet of long-range bombers capable of reaching Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. Others concluded that the Allies had not only failed to meaningfully cripple Axis industrial production during World War Two, but carpet bombing campaigns had actually been counterproductive by angering civilian populations and redoubling their collective will to resist. By the sixties some officers questioned the doctrine’s basic applicability on the grounds that Chile lacked the means to supply fuel for continuous bombing missions or manufacture the massive quantities of bombs for such campaigns. Moreover, air battles in the Middle East and South Asia suggested the need for a fleet of modern fighter jets capable of executing precision bombing missions in enemy territory, not the strategic bombers of World War Two.

Internal Security After the Cuban Revolution

General Julio Canessa recalls that irregular, asymmetrical warfare had been a subject of discussion at the Army Academy of War prior to 1961 but only ‘its theoretical aspects’ related to revolutionary wars of decolonization in places like Vietnam and Algeria. Few imagined such concepts would have importance in Latin America. However, Fidel Castro’s formal alignment with the Soviet Union following the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 changed everything. In the coming decade Cuba’s Revolution inspired national liberation movements across the hemisphere and a belief among the radical left in armed struggle as a viable mode of political change. Moreover, Cuba’s defiance of US hegemony resulted in swift US countermeasures to contain the revolution’s influence. Militarily, Washington’s policymakers designated new resources for internal security training and the Pentagon continued to emphasize the continental role of Latin American militaries as defenders of the ‘free world’. Yet, it is important to connect this inter-American context to a larger world context.

As professional soldiers South American officers independently studied a new theory of revolutionary war developed by French soldiers during their efforts to maintain a collapsing colonial empire in Vietnam.
(1945–1954) and Algeria (1954–1962). Roger Trinquier’s influential treatise *Modern Warfare* lambasted what he called the French Army’s traditional mindset, arguing that civilians had to be treated differently in revolutionary wars because enemy combatants sought control over society, not the defeat of a conventional army. Society, then, constituted an all-encompassing battlefield in which every citizen, social institution, and medium of communication constituted a vulnerable target of subversive infiltration. Thus, the state might need to control sectors of civil society deemed vulnerable to ideological penetration—universities, unions, and the press—because subversives used such forums to win popular support for their revolution. Such theoretical concepts spread quickly across the Western Hemisphere. In 1961 the United States and Argentine armies invited French veterans of the Algerian War to lecture about their experiences at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the Higher War Academy in Buenos Aires. Similarly, Chilean soldiers translated accounts of counterinsurgency operations in places ranging from Algeria and Vietnam to Northern Ireland.

After 1961 the word ‘subversive’—used to define internal enemies of the existing state—became a pervasive fixture in Chilean military journals. If ‘subversives’ acquired cultural hegemony, wrote one Chilean officer, the civilian population would cease to defend the existing government. Conversely, a civilian population ideologically committed to the existing government would refuse to supply an irregular army attempting to overthrow it. Cleary, this bipolar framework held the potential to justify varying levels of repression, censorship, and physical removal—either by exile, imprisonment or disappearance—of individuals believed to influence important cultural spaces (union leaders, politicians, clergy, university professors, activists). According to the new paradigm of revolutionary war civil society constituted a front to be secured from internal enemies.

In the sixties Chile’s officers, stationed at remote bases along the length of the national territory, did not live in an isolated bubble. They discussed world events and their own country’s increasingly tense politics. The Cuban Revolution, for instance, introduced questions that transcended the nation-state paradigm. In 1962 one Chilean officer considered the possibility that a loosely allied revolutionary movement might wage guerrilla warfare across South America without clearly delimited borders. He asked if the threat of guerrilla insurgencies trying to replicate the success of Fidel Castro’s revolution justified a central command for joint operations across the continent? With international revolutionaries like Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara talking about a pan-American struggle for national liberation this was a new conceptual possibility. The war in Vietnam clearly transcended national boundaries; guerrillas in the north traveled to theatres of operations in south through Laos and Cambodia along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

In 1967, Major Enrique Yavar remarked that governments in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina had achieved varying degrees of
success fighting guerrilla movements with police and military forces, but not one Latin American government had completely eliminated the problem due to the basic fact that guerrillas enjoyed greater mobility and decentralized command structures, which they used to neutralize the superior firepower of conventional armies. For Yavar, the solution to this problem was in the recruitment and training of imaginative sub-officials endowed with the freedom to operate independently of central command. Only then could dispersed guerrillas be pursued and effectively destroyed.\textsuperscript{48} In other words, a semi-autonomous police force with broad powers to seek and destroy the enemy. In 1973 this line of thought found expression as the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), Pinochet’s feared secret police.

During the later half of the sixties Chilean officers watched the most powerful military on earth humbled by a determined adversary. In 1968 Chilean Colonel Hernán Bejares wrote that the North American experience in Vietnam ‘is for us, an inexhaustible source of lessons about the ability of enemy combatants to overcome adverse conditions.’\textsuperscript{49} In spite of the United States’ helicopters and high altitude bombers the Viet Cong had demonstrated the ability of highly motivated soldiers with intimate knowledge of local terrain to survive a confrontation with a technologically superior army.\textsuperscript{50} Technology, in other words, was taken off its pedestal as the principal determinant of military success. Dispersed guerrilla forces could chasten a powerful conventional army. A tiny state such as Israel could defeat a coalition of well-armed, hostile states. Will and determination could surmount seemingly impossible handicaps.

Speaking with Régis Debray in 1971, Salvador Allende commented on a trip he had made to North Vietnam saying, ‘It was in Vietnam that the conviction I had felt, physically felt, in Cuba, was reaffirmed: a united, politically aware people, a people whose leaders have the moral fortitude, the prestige and the influence of Ho Chi Minh, is an invincible people.’\textsuperscript{51} Allende explained to Debray that his socialist revolution would build momentum as imperialist attacks and treasonous acts by domestic ‘reactionaries’ elevated the people’s revolutionary consciousness. In short, a strong, determined leader backed by politically conscious supporters could overcome powerful external pressures or the temporary lack of an electoral majority.

Other Chileans took very different lessons from Cuba and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{52} In 1966 Major Manuel Contreras wrote that the pernicious nature of Marxist-Leninism had caused the Vietnam War, fracturing the country and causing guerrillas to take up arms against their fellow countrymen. The future chief of Pinochet’s secret police believed the United States was wasting time with politically sensitive strategies. To win the war he thought US forces would have to completely destroy an enemy committed to bringing the entire country under communist tyranny.\textsuperscript{53} Hard line soldiers like Contreras eschewed holistic theories of counterinsurgency attuned to culture and political context.\textsuperscript{54} In his mind South Vietnam was one frontier
in the global struggle to contain and destroy an expansive ideology; those Vietnamese ‘infected’ by Marxism had become unredeemable agents of a foreign ideology. Vietnam, to be sure, reinforced his perception of the threat posed by ‘Marxist subversives’ and the hard line tactics needed to defeat them.

In the wake of the Tet Offensive (1968), Contreras and Colonel Augustín Toro—both writing from the academy of war—offered a more complete analysis of the conflict including their conviction that Washington could only win the war if it continued to send its best trained and committed special forces to confront the Viet Cong while simultaneously abandoning all efforts to the ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese population. In their view, ‘killing guerrillas, destroying their hideouts, and submitting the civilian population to the strictest of surveillance’ was the only way the war would be won. And yet these two Chilean officers did not underestimate Hanoi’s resolve, acknowledging that North American leaders might well have to accept the prospect of battling for decades to come, village to village, in order to destroy all Marxist guerrillas in the South and possibly invade the North.

A New Regional Context: South America’s National Security States

Long before 1960 Chile’s military leadership conceived of state security as something that depended on stable political development, manageable internal divisions, international alliances, and a healthy economy, not simply preparation to defend the state from external attack. On the last point, Fernando Matthei indicates that by the time he was sub-director of the Air Force War Academy in 1968 most officers had come to believe doctrinal debates were of secondary importance to the imperative of achieving economic growth. Without a strong economy, these officers reasoned, the government would lack resources to acquire and maintain a modern military deterrent. Thus, a government incapable of achieving political stability and steady economic growth constituted a grave threat to national security.

In 1964, 1966, and 1968 the armed forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Peru seized power from civilians on the grounds that inept politicians had failed to manage social tensions and achieve economic growth. Their national security doctrine claimed military participation in national politics was both legitimate and necessary to protect the state from internal threats and to ensure a stable process of social, political, and economic development. Scholars described these new military regimes as ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ on account of their impersonal, technocratic characteristics and because they expressed institutional beliefs rather than those of a single man.

What impact did these new military regimes have on the Chilean armed forces? For one, they upset the Southern Cone’s strategic balance of forces by spending more on defense. In 1969 Peru devoted 3.2 of its GNP to defense expenditures while Chile, a less populous country, devoted almost
half that (1.7 percent). What if these military regimes sought to resolve their outstanding border issues with Chile by force? Army Commander Carlos Prats writes that in 1970 two minor incidents at the Chile/Argentina border combined with a report of Peruvian troops massing in Arequipa heightened the anxiety of military leaders already sensitive to their ‘declining military potential relative to neighboring armies’. The military’s concerns over external security also occurred against the domestic backdrop of rising political and economic destabilization.

The existence of military governments across the developing world elicited the notice, and even implicit admiration from some Chilean soldiers. In 1970, Chilean Army Major Claudio López’s article ‘The Armed Forces in the Third World’ proposed a hypothesis to explain the global wave of military regimes. ‘If militaries overthrow a civilian government it is often due to the fact that they subjectively believe the government lacks efficiency, which activates their ‘latent’ institutional functions as safeguard of patriotism and national tradition.’ López distinguished between the ‘manifest’ functions of the armed forces (external defense, maintaining internal order, providing disaster relief) and ‘latent’ functions (giving citizens a sense of belonging to a nation and protecting national values). As a result of these dynamics militaries intervened in politics when they believed disintegrative forces and extremist inclinations threatened the nation.

Pointing to the Middle East, López observed that the armies of Turkey, Iraq, Egypt and Pakistan shared the same self-appointed mission to build cohesive, modern, secular states. Gamal Nasser did not simply overthrow Egypt’s petty aristocracy; he also sought to build strong a pan-Arab socialist movement. Likewise, officers in the newly independent states of Africa and Asia faced immediate national security threats such as ill-defined borders and weak national consciousness. As members of a ‘national institution’ it was entirely natural for them to feel compelled by ‘patriotic’ sentiments to remove civilian leaders who failed to accomplish vital national objectives. Like most of his colleagues, López considered the Chilean military’s apoliticism a source of institutional strength, but he considered Chile’s internal problems unexceptional when compared to other countries in the third world.

‘The Armed Forces in the Third World’ is interesting as a general reflection on the phenomenon of military rule in the developing world and the motives of soldiers who intervened in civilian politics. It framed most third world military interventions in a positive light and criticized the tendency of scholars in Europe and the United States to offer mono-causal explanations for military behavior based on deterministic presuppositions about social class or American military aid. Western scholars, wrote López, fundamentally misunderstood the distinct role of soldiers in underdeveloped countries and their basic motivations.

The existence of military regimes across South America presented a new model for Chilean soldiers to consider; that of the national security
state lasting years, even decades. And by virtue of their service journal exchanges Chilean officers were well aware of how these regimes justified an expanded military role in society. In 1972, amid Chile’s escalating political crisis, Colonel Hugo Moya went so far as to argue that the role of the armed forces in developed countries was confined to external defense while militaries in the developing world had a much more complex and variable role that could include rectifying structural deficiencies in the nation’s political and economic order, excluding extreme ideologies, or simply maintaining institutional stability. Moya praised military governments in Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador Moya for initiating highway projects designed to connect territorial hinterlands to major population centers. It seemed natural to him that military men should direct such nation-building projects since state infrastructure and economic development have national security implications. Echoes of Moya’s ideas had appeared in service journals for some time, but now they appeared as a coherent thesis justifying military participation in the political system.

Contemplating Intervention

Chilean officers knew that political involvement carried serious risks and uncertainties. Political deliberation was a career ending offense that distracted from professional matters and could compromise military readiness. Senior officers could actually recall the period from 1924 to 1931 when military involvement in politics had poisoned morale, harmed inter-service unity, and produced a strong civilian backlash. In 1970 institutional leaders rejected the idea of an illegal, barracks uprising to prevent a democratically elected Marxist president from coming to power. Officers had strong misgivings about the Popular Unity coalition and its relationship to international communism, but it was unclear what a Marxist government operating inside of a liberal democracy would do. Would it dramatically amplify class contradictions or mostly carry out structural reforms that increased the state’s sovereignty over strategic resources, a long held geopolitical goal of the entire armed forces?

There is a large corpus of scholarship that has examined the political crisis in Chile, its internal and external causes, and ultimate outcome. Suffice to say, the country’s unfolding political crisis from 1972 to 1973 convinced a strong majority of officers that Chile’s president had run afoul of the constitution and he was unwilling or incapable of controlling his political coalition, especially the extreme left. From the armed forces’ perspective Salvador Allende’s government represented an existential threat to the Chilean state. Patricio Carvajal, an admiral in the navy, comments that two things brought the entire armed forces together in 1973 and made them aware of shared feelings towards the government. First, a group of retired generals and admirals wrote a letter to president Allende expressing their concerns publicly about the national security implications of a bitterly divided country and the dangers of an economy weakened by hyperinflation and plummeting production. Second, Allende’s proposed reform
of the educational system—*Escuela Nacional Unificada*—aroused passionate opposition from each branch of the armed forces. Officers suspected that the government intended to use the schools to indoctrinate the country’s children. After congressional elections in March failed to resolve the country’s political stalemate the situation grew more even more volatile. To many Chileans civil war appeared a distinct possibility. In this hyperpolarized situation the armed forces feared its own division. What if a column of soldiers loyal to Allende formed and opposed the majority that was planning a coup? In 1891 a political dispute between the executive and legislature had pitted the army and navy against each other. Such concerns loomed over the high command as it contemplated political intervention. As a preemptive measure, the army, navy, and air force, navy began identifying, isolating, and even imprisoning suspected regime loyalists.

In November 1972 Army Commander in Chief Carlos Prats insisted that a military coup was not only illegal, it could result in a violent cataclysm if UP supporters flooded the streets to defend Allende’s government. In June 1973 a group of junior officers launched a failed putsch against Allende—the *Tanquetazo*—elevating fears among senior officers that the verticality of command could be fractured. At the same time, officers observed that Allende’s call for workers to mass in the streets during the *Tanquetazo* had gone largely unheeded. Nonetheless, military leaders feared that a *coup d’etat* could provoke massive popular resistance, a prospect they resolved to prevent.

**Implementing a National Security Doctrine, 1973–1975**

Army, navy, and air force chiefs concurred on an important piece of strategy when they overthrew Salvador Allende’s government September 11, 1973: their operation had to be decisive, swift, and uncompromising and show partisans of the deposed government the utter futility of resistance. Among the junta’s first edicts was an ultimatum that the presidential palace would be bombarded at 11 am if Allende did not surrender, followed by the warning that all resistance to the junta ‘will be punished in the most drastic manner on the very site where the resistance occurs.’ The precision bombing of Chile’s presidential palace, the most iconic and searing image from the coup, made a powerful statement about the operational capacity of the armed forces and their determination to crush all opposition.

Events in Algeria, Vietnam, and Latin America had demonstrated that once insurgent movements put down roots in society they proved exceptionally difficult to contain. In nearby Argentina urban guerillas wreaked havoc with bombs, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations to weaken a military government regarded as illegitimate. The rapid imposition of military rule accompanied by overwhelming force represented one way to pre-empt any sort of protracted struggle with Allende’s coalition. Several months after the coup a journalist asked Army General Sergio Arellano
why militants from Allende’s government had mustered so little resistance. The general replied that the armed forces had completely surprised them with ‘speed and decisiveness’. Similarly, Air Force General Nicanor Díaz explained that one B-26 equipped with sixteen machine guns had dispersed a group of Allende partisans marching towards the La Moneda presidential palace by firing several bursts of fire ahead of the crowd. Such determined shows of force, he reasoned, pre-empted resistance from the outset.73

There was little consensus in the Chilean armed forces about the exact type of military regime to be established in 1973-its policies, duration, and objectives-only strong agreement that Salvador Allende’s government had to be overthrown and Marxist parties should be excluded from power. However, Chilean officers did regard themselves at the vital center of the East-West conflict. Shortly after the coup Navy Commander in Chief José Toribio Merino expressed his concern that Cuban ships might be delivering arms to dissidents inside the country or using coastal islands as way stations for the transfer of weapons to the continent. On October 8, the junta’s first order of business was to ‘analyze, in detail, the worrying fact that a scarce number of large arms have been found despite the fact that [the left] is certain to have at least five or ten thousand more arms interred or still circulating.’ These exchanges put into perspective the junta’s belief that it was engaged in a confrontation with international communism and one in which Popular Unity militants had a greater capacity for armed resistance and they actually did. The perception of international communism as a threat transcending national borders clearly influenced Manuel Contreras’ strategic initiative to coordinate the capture and assassination of leftists across the continent (Operation Condor), a plan he presented to South American intelligence chiefs in 1975.75

In 1973 some Chilean officers, but not all, subscribed to a national security doctrine that defined the country in a state of internal war necessitating unconventional tactics to defeat domestic subversives. In 1991 the Rettig Report identified a commission of army colonels, imbued with this doctrine, as having successfully lobbied to create an autonomous secret police that would commit the most egregious human rights violations in Chilean history.76 Comando Conjunto, a separate, clandestine organization formed in 1975 by air force intelligence officers had a similar aim: eradicate leftist ‘subversion’.77 Where did the ideology supporting these institutions come from? The Rettig Report pointed to a mixture of external factors. First, it mentioned the Algerian War and the counterinsurgency tactics and theory of revolutionary war that proceeded from the conflict. Second, the Cuban Revolution and crucially, Ernesto Guevara’s theory of *foquismo* had urged militants in Latin America to create focal points of armed insurrection in rural zones across the continent. After Guevara’s death in 1967 guerillas in Uruguay and Brazil revised Guevara’s theory to include urban theatres as well. Finally, the report assigned a role to the United States for providing counterinsurgency training to the continent’s militaries. While not
necessary ideological in itself, counterinsurgency techniques held the potential to define all Marxists as enemies undeserving of normative legal protection. Missing from the Rettig Report is mention of Chilean geopolitics and the school’s potential to dehumanize individuals within the superhuman entity of the state. Additionally, Chilean soldiers’ analyses of the Vietnam War and their awareness of the difficulty other Latin American governments were having combating internal insurrections proved important factors which coalesced to underpin a national security doctrine that justified repression, even elimination of societal elements deemed threats to the state.

The unprecedented amount of force employed at the outset of the coup achieved the junta’s immediate objective of insure compliance with the regime’s directives, but it also elicited strong international condemnation, something Chile’s military leaders failed to anticipate. From the junta’s perspective the Soviet Union and its allies had orchestrated a massive attack against the country including the UN resolutions that condemned Chile for human rights abuses. Prior to 1973 military intellectual culture took a dim view of the United Nations as a politicized body, which neither served the interests of small states, nor legitimately expressed world opinion. Rather, it was used by the world’s ‘great powers’ to impinge on the sovereignty of small states. Chilean officers viewed any notion of an authentic world voice or international standard of justice with skepticism. World events had reinforced a conviction that the condemnation of one country by an international body or by a group of countries depended on political and ideological factors more than anything else. During the Vietnam War, communist leaders in Hanoi had declared all North American POWs war criminals undeserving of protection under the Geneva Convention. Pol Pot’s horrific crimes in Cambodia attracted scant international condemnation while the violation of human rights in Chile had become a weekly mention in the New York Times. The difference, officers said, had to do with the influence of Chile’s Marxist enemies in the West and the Soviet bloc.

Chile and Peru since 1973

From 1974 to 1976 border scares and heightened tensions with Peru’s military government kept the Chilean armed forces on high alert and wary of the dreaded possibility that a local conflict could expand into a simultaneous confrontation with Peru and Argentina. Sources within Chile’s armed forces all attest to the shared experience of preparing to defend the country from outside attack with limited conventional forces. In the early part of 1974, Peru’s armed forces completed a series of coordinated exercises in the southernmost region of Tacna, much to the alarm of Chile’s military government. Peru had recently acquired three hundred T-55 battle tanks and fifty SU-22 fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile the international outcry following Salvador Allende’s violent overthrow in 1973 had complicated the Chilean government’s ability to purchase arms
from the West. Diplomatically isolated and militarily vulnerable, a siege mentality gripped Santiago. Was Peru’s nationalistic military government planning an offensive operation to reclaim territories lost during the nineteenth century?

One contingent of Chilean officers, especially in the army, argued that a preemptive attack was the best strategy to deal with a hostile, better-equipped Peru. Impressed with Israel’s lightning offensive during the Six Days War Army General Carlos Forestier insisted that Chile had to strike first rather than wait for an impending Peruvian invasion. Fernando Matthei, then a colonel in the air force, reports that the idea of preventive war appealed to some air force officers given the institution’s prevailing doctrine of ‘strategic bombardment’, which held that the air force should annihilate the manufacturing capabilities, transportation network, and communication infrastructure of an enemy state. Matthei, however, insisted that Chile completely lacked the capability to deliver a knock-out blow to Peru as Israel had done to Egypt. ‘To my great dismay they had all apparently become “Israelites” including—to my great surprise—Contardo and Reveco [Matthei’s colleagues at the Air Force Academy of War]. In vain I attempted to explain that our political, geographical and military situation was nothing like that of Israel in 1967.’

Matthei recounts that some time after May 1974 the Estado Mayor de la Defensa Nacional—Chile’s Joint Chiefs of Staff—met to discuss the feasibility of a surprise attack against Peru. During a lengthy exposition army officers presented graphic charts illustrating Peru’s conventional superiority and then, perhaps surprisingly, insisted that a preemptive attack was the best option to overcome the strategic imbalance of forces. Relying on courage and superior morale, they reasoned, Chilean forces would invade Peru up to the Sama River (Tacna region) and put Chile in a position of strength to negotiate a favorable political settlement. In other words, they imagined replicating Israel’s successful conquest and occupation of the Sinai Peninsula in 1967.

The navy and air force viewed the army’s plan with skepticism. Captain Eric Solís, representing the navy, explained that his institution could only participate in a preemptive war if the government allocated vast resources for new naval acquisitions. This signaled institutional disapproval since the climate of economic austerity—as everyone knew—precluded any such allocations. When Matthei’s turn to speak came he explained that Peru would presumably dispatch its fleet of high altitude Canberra bombers at the outbreak of hostilities to destroy Chile’s air force base in Antofogasta, thereby rendering the country’s lone northern airfield inoperable. He also estimated that Peru’s air force was four or five times more powerful than Chile’s and concluded ‘I can guarantee that the Peruvians will shred to pieces the Chilean Air Force during the first five minutes of the war.’ According to Matthei, the junta considered a surprise attack utter folly, but it nonetheless faced ‘strong pressures from below’ to consider an offensive operation against Peru.
To this day the Chilean military has revealed very little about its contingency plans regarding Peru or Argentina, but one well-known source supports the credibility of Matthei’s account. In 1976 Augusto Pinochet and Admiral Patricio Carvajal, Chile’s foreign minister, met privately with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before a meeting of the Organization of American States in Santiago. The conversation briefly dealt with human rights, but rather quickly it moved on to the subject of regional security. Pinochet wanted to know if the United States would provide military assistance to Chile in the event of war with Peru and he asked, hypothetically, how would Washington react if Chile preemptively attacked Peru? Kissinger responded that circumstances would determine the North American position if war broke out between the two rivals. The Secretary’s non-committal position surprised Pinochet who clearly expected US political and material support in light of Peru’s relationship to the Soviet Union.\(^{83}\)

In 1976 Chilean Army Colonel Gerardo Rencores wrote that the nature of modern warfare had created new requirements for the state: external security demanded a technologically advanced conventional deterrent capable of winning regional wars of ‘brief but brutal’ intensity while internal security required a mixture of repression and social justice to defeat ‘subversion’ in its early stages.\(^{84}\) Placing Rencores’ remarks in context it is clear that he expected inter-state wars to replicate certain essential characteristics from the Indo-Pakistani and Arab-Israeli wars, such as their brevity. These armed struggles had demonstrated that states lacking the industrial capacity to manufacture advanced weaponry for a protracted struggle would likely deploy their arms with great intensity at the outbreak of a conflict in order to achieve a rapid decision. By contrast, a struggle with internal subversives could drag on for years, as had been the case in Algeria, Vietnam, and parts of Latin America. The state, wrote Rencores, had to defeat armed militants quickly while implementing ‘an economic policy that eradicates poverty, especially extreme poverty’ to dampen the appeal of radical ideologies.\(^{85}\)

Concerning the last point it is worth mentioning that in 1973 there was a consensus in the armed forces dating back to the 1930s that state administered social justice would dampen the appeal of radical ideologies and give the government legitimacy in the eyes of the population. However, officers disagreed over the specific balance between repression and social justice or what economic model would best achieve the geopolitical goals of high growth and reduced poverty. When Pinochet decided to adopt economic policies with a high social cost and negative effect on the organized working class it generated friction inside of Chile’s high command.\(^{86}\) Nonetheless, the junta agreed that the institutional reforms represented the correct geopolitical strategy to modernize the state and achieve the goals of economic growth and social stability. In the short term, the government would rely on repression to quell dissent and maintain acquiescence from the population.
Conclusions

This article has put the Chilean military’s national security doctrine in the context of its academic tradition and study of foreign events. From 1945 to 1975 international circumstances challenged, altered, and reinforced doctrinal and ideological precepts within the Chilean armed forces. In the fifties Chilean officers expected armed conflicts to resemble the previous two World Wars in their essential characteristics, but the Arab-Israel and Indo-Pakistani wars called into question some of those assumptions. At the start of the sixties a new theory of revolutionary war, which conceived of the national population as vulnerable to internal subversion greatly influenced the way some officers viewed their own nation and the methods necessary to protect the existing state. National liberation movements in Latin America and Vietnam contributed to a conviction that a ‘hard coup’ was necessary to overthrow Salvador Allende’s government. Israel’s stunning triumph in the Six Days War influenced the Chilean military’s contemplation of a pre-emptive strike against Peru in 1974. Armed conflicts also shaped officers’ attitudes about the nature of the world system: the United Nations, the Cold War, and the North-South divide.

The United States’ role training South American militaries during the Cold War had an important legacy, but it should not lead to the impression that the Pentagon provisioned all the doctrine and ideology to the continent’s militaries. Such a perception misunderstands the level of autonomy and sophistication of a military like Chile’s. Chile’s tradition of geopolitical analysis with its concept of the nation-state as living organism subject to periodic cycles of decay and renewal formed one conceptual bedrock for thinking about national security and gave substance to policies enacted during the military regime. As students of warfare, Chilean soldiers contemplated theory and doctrine emanating from France, Brazil, Great Britain, and United States and they did so as professionals of an underdeveloped country with limited conventional forces, potentially threatening neighbors, longstanding anti-communist sentiments, and different concerns and questions than armed forces in the developed core. From 1945 to 1975 the Pentagon played an important role elevating the technical sophistication of the Chile’s armed forces and promoting a sense of shared mission to protect the western hemisphere from communism. At the same time, it is important to maintain a historically grounded conception of Chile’s armed forces as reproducing an indigenous intellectual culture while simultaneously linked to a hemispheric context dominated by the United States and to world/regional context. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution the Pentagon promoted a new focus on internal security, but that did not negate the Chilean military’s preoccupation with external threats from Peru and Argentina or its independent study military regimes abroad and their practice of countersinurgency.

Prior to the start of the Cold War militaries in Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil possessed high levels of professional development.
Within this group of countries the Chilean military has been noted for its ‘Prussian’ qualities: respect for hierarchy, rigid discipline, devotion to study, and rigorous professional preparation. These qualities had a major impact on political outcomes in the seventies. An ingrained respect for hierarchy helped Augusto Pinochet consolidate his position atop the army’s chain of command. The 1973 coup, which so shocked the world for its violence evinced a military capable of swift mobilization, precise military operations, and the erection of an efficient authoritarian state. More generally, Chilean soldiers saw study and rigorous preparation as integral to national defense in light of country’s geographic isolation, extensive borders, and encirclement by potentially hostile neighbors.

Endnotes
1 See, for example, Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: military training and political violence in the Americas (Durham 2004); Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: the United States and Latin America (Durham 1998).
2 One notable exception is political scientist Alfred Stepan. He discovered that Brazil’s Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) developed the ideology underpinning the Brazilian military’s assumption of power in 1964 as opposed to its merely adopting a national security doctrine created and disseminated by the Pentagon. See Alfred Stepan, ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion’, in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: origins, policies, and future (New Haven 1973), pp. 47–65.
3 See Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers: European military professionalism in South America, 1890–1940 (Lincoln 1983); Frank D. McCann, Soldiers of the Patria: a history of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937 (Palo Alto 2004).
5 See, for instance, Greg Grandin, The Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the rise of the new imperialism (New York 2006), p. 49. For a critique of O’Donnell’s interpretation as well as Marxist and structuralist approaches to the military see Alain Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley 1987), pp. 1–16.
6 In Chile political scientist Augusto Varas argued that the armed forces lacked an official doctrine regarding their place in society from 1932 to 1973. This ‘orfandad ideológica’ allowed the Pentagon to fill the vacuum with its own national security doctrine. Augusto Varas, Los militares en el poder: régimen y gobierno militar en Chile 1973–1986 (Santiago 1987).
7 National security doctrine refers to military participation in national politics in order to protect the state from groups deemed threats and to ensure a stable process of social, political, and economic development.
14 Bernardo Parada Moreno, Polemología básica (Santiago 1968), pp. 51, 103–112. The Chilean military effectively applied Parada’s principles on September 11, 1973 when it carried out an exceptionally efficient military operation marked by a massive show of force in Santiago.
15 See note 35.
17 Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Geopolítica: diferentes etapas para el estudio geopolítico de los estados (Santiago 1968), p. 21. Pinochet taught geopolitics and military geography at Chile’s Army Academy of War. He also taught both subjects at Ecuador’s Academy of War from 1956 to 1959.
19 Lieutenant Colonel Humberto Medina Parker, ‘Sangre y suelo de Chile – su geopolítica en acción’, Memorial del Ejército de Chile, No. 222 (1948). For an enlightening overview of geopolitical precepts in which the state is conceived as a human body see Lieutenant Colonel Ramón Valdés Martínez, Major Hector Bravo Muñoz, and Major Rolando Garay Cifuentes, ‘La geografía y el poder nacional’, Memorial del Ejército de Chile, No. 300 (1961).
20 Arriagada, El pensamiento político de los militares, p. 138.
22 On the subject of authority as it is granted to or claimed by individuals with scientific knowledge see Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977, (ed.) Colin Gordon (New York 1980), p. 93.
23 Patricia Arancibia Clavel, and Francisco Balart Páez, Conversando con el General Julio Canessa Robert (Santiago 2006), p. 77.


30 Manuel Montt Martínez, *La guerra: su conducción política y estratégica* (Santiago 1955). Montt’s book became a standard text at the Army Academy of War where Montt was director from 1957 to 1959.


Unlike the 1965 war, India achieved an unqualified victory over Pakistan in 1971, forcing it to give up what would become Bangladesh. In service journals Chilean officers stressed that India had avoided intelligence failures from the first war and effectively responded to Pakistan’s initial offensive with quick decisive blows. ‘La campaña relámpago, la Guerra Indo-Pakistana 1971’, Memorial del Ejército de Chile, No. 369 (1972); ‘India y Pakistán: el otro conflicto de nuestros días’, Revista de la Fuerza Aérea, No. 125 (1972).


Patricia Arancibia Clavel, and Isabel de la Maza Cave, Matthei: mi testimonio (Santiago 2003), p. 110.

Arancibia and Balart, Conversando con el General Julio Canessa Robert, p. 68.

Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency (New York 1964), pp. 6, 16–25. Trinquier also made the controversial assertion that politically motivated terrorism was not criminal, but it legitimized the State’s right to torture captured insurgents in order to extract information from them.

See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Grand D’Esnon (French Army), ‘Guerra subversiva’, Memorial del Ejército de Chile, No. 301 (1961); Colonel David L. Evans III (USA), ‘Lecciones derivadas de las operaciones de contrainsurgencia’, Revista de la Fuerza Aérea, No. 100 (1966).


It is worth mentioning that Lieutenant Colonel Augusto Pinochet was sub-director of the Army Academy of War in the early sixties when the subject of irregular warfare had recently become important. During that time period he made the acquaintance of an intelligent young captain named Manuel Contreras.


57 Arancibia and de la Maza, Matthei: mi testimonio, p. 134.


61 Prats, Memorias, p.148.


65 For an account of institutional sentiment for political deliberation at the time of the “tacnazo” in 1969 see Ismael Huerta Díaz, Volvería a ser marino (Santiago 1988), p. 388.

66 A good overview of events leading up to the coup and the armed forces relationship to Chile’s political crisis can be found in Informe de la comisión nacional de verdad y reconciliación, Vol. I, Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (Santiago 1996), pp. 30–37.


68 See Fernando Villagrán, Disparen a la bandada: una crónica secreta de la FACH (Santiago 2002) and Jorge Magasich A., Los que dijeron “NO”: historia del movimiento de los marinos antigolpistas de 1973 (Santiago 2008).

69 Ercilla, November 29, 1972, pp. 11–12. Prats hoped that the March 1973 congressional election would resolve the prevailing stalemate.
70 Arancibia, and Balart, Conversando con el General Julio Canessa Robert, p. 129.
71 Manuel A. Garretón Merino, Por la fuerza sin la razón: análisis y textos de los bandos de la dictadura militar (Santiago 1998), p. 58.
72 Ercilla, December 19, 1973, p. 16.
73 Mary Helen Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land: the Pinochet regime in Chile (Berkeley 1994), pp. 44–45.
74 Actas de la Honorable Junta de Gobierno, No. 5, 9–19–73; No. 7, 9–21–73; No. 17, 10–8–73. These legislative sessions of the Chilean military government are located at the Biblioteca Nacional del Congreso.
75 J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America (Lanham 2005).
76 Informe de la comisión nacional de verdad y reconciliación, p. 37.
77 Mónica González and Héctor Contreras, Los secretos del Comando Conjunto (Santiago 1991).
79 See José Rodríguez Elizondo, Chile-Perú: el siglo que vivimos en peligro (Santiago 2005). In December 1978 Chile and Argentina appeared headed towards a military confrontation as a result of the two countries’ unresolved dispute over several islands in the Beagle Channel. See Patricia Arancibia Clavel and Francisco Bulnes Serrano, La escuadra en acción, 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas (Santiago 2005).
80 Arancibia, and de la Maza, Matthei: mi testimonio, p. 193.
81 Ibid. 195.
82 Ibid.
85 Ibid.